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By CECILY ANNE SNYDER*
DURING THE SUMMER of 1999, the United States Supreme Court
delivered a pair of decisions that have been the subject of much dis-
cussion among Intellectual Property ("IP") practitioners.1 The first
case, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Sav-
ings Bank,2 held that Congress could not constitutionally abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity by permitting private parties to bring a law-
suit for patent infringement against the state under the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act3 ("PRCA"). 4 The
companion case, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed-
ucation Expense Board,5 further held that Congress could not constitu-
tionally abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by permitting private
parties to bring a trademark infringement suit against the state under
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act 6 ("TRCA").7 Congress' ratio-
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1. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Essay: Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1161, 1162 (2001) (commenting that the Supreme Court's conclusion that
there is sovereign immunity "has generated a firestorm of criticism"); Florida Prepaid v.
College Savings, COPYRIGHT L.J., July-Aug. 1999, at 50, 52 (describing the Court's decision
as a "bad decision" and one that upheld state's rights over "200 years of uniform, settled
law").
2. 527 U.S. 627 (1999) [hereinafter Florida Prepaid 1].
3. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
4. See Florida Prepaid 1, 527 U.S. at 660.
5. 527 U.S. 666 (1999) [hereinafter Ilorida Prepaid II].
6. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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nale for enacting the PRCA and the TRCA was based largely on its
rationale for enacting the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act8
("CRCA")-that states should not be immune from infringement
claims.
In the wake of these decisions, an important question arises: Will
the Supreme Court find that Congress lacked the authority to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity under the CRCA, as it did in Florida
Prepaid I and 1I with regard to the PRCA and TRCA, respectively?9
Moreover, the broader question arises as to whether it is fair to allow a
state to act as a commercial participant-benefiting financially from
exploiting the patent, trademark, and copyright systems-without be-
ing held accountable for its infringing activities. 10 Not only have the
Florida Prepaid decisions been condemned by the IP Bar, but legisla-
tion was quickly proposed to limit their effect.11 Additionally, at least
7. See Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. at 691.
8. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
9. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether the CRCA is
invalid, courts have interpreted the Florida Prepaid decisions to stand for the proposition
that the CRCA is also an invalid attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Rodri-
guez v. Texas Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
CRCA does not effectively abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment in a case where plaintiff sued the State of Texas for infringing on his registered
copyright by selling specialized license plates to Texas residents); see also Chavez v. Arte
Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the CRCA did not effectively
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in a case where Arte
Publico Press (a division of the University of Houston) published unauthorized copies Cha-
vez's copyrighted book); Peter Bray, Note, After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, Are
States Subject to Suit for Copyright Infingement?: The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and Cha-
vez v. Arte Publico Press, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1531, 1596 (1999) (arguing that the Chavez
court should conclude that the University of Houston was not entitled to sovereign immu-
nity because it had deprived Chavez of her property without due process).
10. The United States Patent and Trademark Office hosted a one day conference of
constitutional law scholars on March 31, 2000. See IP, Constitutional Scholars Explore Sovereign
Immunity Issues, 59 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 743, 743 (Apr. 7, 2000). During
the conference, the United States Patent and Trademark Office presented statistics evi-
dencing that "several states have amassed large portfolios of intellectual property." Id. at
744. These portfolios are typically licensed and generate considerable income for the
states. See id. A recent survey performed by the Association of University Technology Man-
agers ("AUTM") reported that the previous year's royalty income for the University sector
was $800 million. See Symposium, Patent Rights and Licensing, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 3,
60 (Spring 2000), at http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/.
11. See Intellectual Property Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong. § 111
(1999) (proposing to condition a state's participation in the federal intellectual property
system on an unambiguous waiver of immunity). The bill also proposed that pending pat-
ent applications by a state would be regarded as abandoned and no damages would be
awarded in any action by the state to enforce federal intellectual property rights. See Draft
Bill Would Restore Right to Sue for Infringement, 58 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 807,
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one case, decided after Florida Prepaid I and II, has held that a state
waives its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 2 by applying for
a patent and thus benefiting from the federal patent system.' 3
While many domestic issues result from the Supreme Court's Flor-
ida Prepaid decisions,14 this Comment discusses the implications of the
decisions with regard to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 15
("GATT"). Specifically, this Comment focuses on how the decisions
affect the United States compliance with the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Agreements 16 ("TRIPs" or "TRIPs Agreement")
portion of GATT.
819 (Oct. 21, 1999). The legislation was not considered during the first session of the
106th Congress. See Draft Revisions of State Immunity Bill Reveal Continued Interest in Reform, 59
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 545, 545 (Feb. 11, 2000). Two new drafts of the
legislation were circulated during the second session of Congress last term. See id. One
draft provided for "specific language for the 'declarations' required for such a waiver." Id.
It also stipulated that "a state can 'opt out' of the federal IP system by ensuring that the
state's IP rights have been dedicated to the public." Id. The second draft bill was proposed
by the Copyright Office and established "a more unassailable abrogation of state immunity
than the ones invalidated last year by the Supreme Court." Id. at 546. Currently, no bills are
pending in either house on this topic. See http://thomas.loc.gov (last visitedJan. 28, 2001).
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." Id.
13. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242
(E.D. Cal. 1999). New Star Laser, Inc. brought an action against the University of Califor-
nia for declaratory judgment, seeking to invalidate the University's patent. See id. The dis-
trict court in New Laser refused to grant the University's motion to dismiss based on
Eleventh Amendment, which the University claimed it was entitled to under F/orida Prepaid
I. See id. In denying the motion, the district court stated:
The Regents wish to take the good without the bad. The court can conceive of no
other context in which a litigant may lawfully enjoy all the benefits of a federal
property or right while rejecting its limitations .... A patent constitutes a "gift or
gratuity" bestowed by the federal government, and if Congress has conditioned its
receipt on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to a declaratory suit, then
Congress has acted permissibly.
Id. at 1244 (citing Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627, 686-87 (1999)).
14. See, e.g., John O'Connor, Note, Taking TRIPs to the Eleventh Amendment: The After-
math of the College Savings Cases, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 1003, 1017 (2000) (discussing possible
avenues that might be available for pursuing a state entity that is infringing IP rights).
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT resulted from unsuccessful attempts to
establish an International Trade Organization after the Second World War. See I LAW AND
PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, at 1-2 (Kenneth R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1994). The agree-
ment provides a treaty mechanism for establishing a code of conduct for international
trade. See id.
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
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Part I of this Comment explains the TRCA, PRCA, and CRCA
(collectively, "Clarification Acts") enacted by Congress to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity from private lawsuits for infringement. Part
II discusses GATT/TRIPs and its implementation in the United States.
Part III focuses on the Supreme Court decisions in Florida Prepaid I
and II. Part IV proposes a hypothetical situation involving a foreign
national who brings suit in federal court against a state for infringe-
ment of its United States intellectual property rights. This Part dis-
cusses a foreign national's standing to sue and demonstrates how the
Florida Prepaid decisions effectively prohibit the foreign national's in-
fringement suit in contravention of United States obligations under
the TRIPs Agreement. Part V discusses possible solutions to this di-
lemma, but highlights their inadequacies. This Comment concludes
that the Florida Prepaid decisions have caused the United States to fall
out of compliance with the GATT/TRIPs Agreement. Specifically, the
Florida Prepaid cases violate GATT/TRIPs by allowing state govern-
ments to usurp private Intellectual Property rights from foreign own-
ers, while being immune from an infringement claim that would
restore the IP owner's right to exclude others and receive monetary
compensation for the taking under the federal statutes.
I. The Clarification Acts
A. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act1 7 ("TRCA") was en-
acted by the Senate on June 12, 1992 and by the House of Representa-
tives on October 3, 1992.18 The purpose of the Act was to "clarify
Congress' intent that states and state entities are not immune from
infringement suits under the Lanham Trademark Act."1 9 In effect, the
TRCA enables private parties to bring infringement actions against
WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
17. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
18. See id.
19. S. REP. No. 102-280, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3088 (refer-
ring to Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)). See also JAY
DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY (1993), §1.02[5], at 1-18-19 (explaining that the Lanham Act provides protection of
commercial symbols used to identify products, services, and its producers in the market-
place and is intended to ensure fair competition and to protect producers' investments in
their reputation and good will).
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governmental agencies when the government infringes on their trade-
mark rights.
The Senate Report accompanying the TRCA legislation noted
that "[t] he Patent Clause was included in the Constitution because of
the failure of individual State patent systems under the Articles of
Confederation to be effective."20 In fact, as noted by James Madison
on September 5, 1787, the Patent Clause contemplated the creation
of a new federal power protecting works of authors and inventors. 21
Due to the lack of opposition, the clause was accepted without a re-
corded debate. 22
After reviewing the history of the Eleventh Amendment, the Sen-
ate concluded in its report that the provisions of Senate Bill 75823 "are
justified under the Patent Clause, the Commerce Clause and the en-
forcement provision of the fourteenth amendment."24 The Patent
Clause provides that Congress shall have the power to "promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for a limited time, to
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writing
and discoveries." 25 On the basis of this clause, Congress determined
that the right to abrogate sovereign immunity "logically falls within
the Government's power to protect patent holders" in an effort to
promote future innovation.2 6 This conclusion, insofar as it applies to
patents and copyrights, is consistent with comments made at the time
the Constitution was ratified.27
20. S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094. See also
BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw 1 (1967) (noting that
there was no provision in the Articles of Confederation protecting the works of authors
and inventors).
21. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 509 (M. Farrand ed.
1937).
22. See BUGBEE, supra note 20, at 1. In fact, "[b]y 1787 ... when the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia, all but one of their states had estab-
lished general copyright legislation, and-although the inadequacy of state protection was
now becoming apparent-the outpouring of state patents for invention was at its height."
Id. at 2.
23. S. 758, 102d Cong. (1992). See also S. REP. No. 102-280, at 1 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3087.
24. S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093-94.
The Supreme Court had previously rejected the argument that Congress had the power to
regulate trademarks under the patent clause. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
The Court concluded that trademarks fall within the Commerce Power. See id. at 91.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. S. REp. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094.
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961). james Madison noted:
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In support of its enactment of the TRCA, the Senate further
stated in its report that "the current state of the law leaves the protec-
tion afforded to patent and trademark holders dependent on the sta-
tus of the infringing party."2 As an example, Congress noted that "[a]
public school such as UCLA can sue a private school such as USC for
patent infringement, yet USC cannot sue UCLA for the same act."29
The Senate concluded that "[s]tate universities should not have an
unjustified advantage in the commercial arena over private universi-
ties for funding because of the potential for immunity from patent
infringement actions." 30 Thus, Congress sought to limit the inherent
unfairness that results when states are allowed to infringe on a trade-
mark without liability by taking away state sovereign immunity in this
limited circumstance. 3 1
The Senate relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause to support its abrogation of state sovereign immunity:
IT] he bill is justified as an acceptable method of enforcing the pro-
visions of the fourteenth amendment. [A district court in Illinois
has] recognized that a patent is a form of property, holding that a
right to compensation exists for patent infringement. Additionally,
because courts have continually recognized patent rights as prop-
erty, the fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving a
person of property without due process of law. The same holds
true in the area of trademarks. Furthermore, the fourteenth
amendment gives Congress the authority to enforce this right.
[Senate Bill] 758 and [Senate Bill] 759 represent a valid extension
of Congress' right to protect the property rights of patent and
trademark holders.32
The analysis provided in the Senate Report relied on the assump-
tion that property rights in patents are equivalent to property rights in
trademarks. 33 The Supreme Court held that the right claimed in Flor-
ida Prepaid H is the right to be free from unfair competition as a result
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right
to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The pub-
lic good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals. The States
cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of
them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of
Congress.
Id.




32. S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3094 (citing Lemelson
v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. II1. 1974)) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
33. See Florida Prepaid 1, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999).
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of false advertising, which is not a right covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 34 The Court further held that the TRCA did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity.35
B. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
Along with the TRCA, the Senate enacted the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act 36 ("PRCA") on June 12,
1992. 3 7 No House Report accompanied the PRCA. Instead, in consid-
ering the PRCA, the House relied fully on the Senate Report prepared
for the TRCA, presumably because, as discussed above, the TRCA's
Senate Report also discussed patent and plant variety rights. 38 Because
there was no separate report detailing its intent, it is likely that Con-
gress' intent in passing the PRCA was the same as that for passing the
TRCA; namely, that states and state entities should be liable for
infringement.
In the Senate Report for the TRCA, Congress discussed several
specific instances of state infringement of issued United States patents
as evidence that state governments had previously taken private patent
rights for their own use without compensating the patent owner. 39
These instances were used to support the Senate's conclusion that a
remedy against state infringers was required to protect private patent
rights. 40
However, the Senate Report did not point to a specific instance
where a state failed to provide due process by compensating the
owner whose property has been taken.41 This omission, as discussed
below, became the primary focus of the Supreme Court when it found
the PRCA unconstitutional. 42
34. See Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
35. See id. at 691.
36. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
37. See id.
38. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3087.
39. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3091.
40. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 5-6, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3091-92 (discuss-
ing Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 332 (Fed. Cir. 1990), wherein Chew, an Ohio resident,
sued the State of California asserting that the process used by California in testing automo-
bile exhaust emissions at state-run centers infringed a patent she held, and Jacobs Wind Elec.
Co., Inc. v. Ka. Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 726-27 (Fed. Cir. 1990), wherein the State of
Florida installed a system to improve water quality which allegedly infringed on Jacobs's
patent).
41. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3095.
42. See Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999).
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C. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act
The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act 43 ("CRCA") was enacted
by the Senate on October 19, 1990 and by the House on October 26,
1990. 44 As noted in the House Report accompanying the CRCA, the
Copyright Act of 197645 contemplated that state governments could
be sued for copyright infringement.46 Congress was specifically re-
sponding to the view taken by the Ninth Circuit in BVEngineering v.
UCLA 47 when it explicitly set forth in the CRCA its intention to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity in accordance with requirements estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.48
The CRCA was introduced at the request of the Copyright Of-
fice 49 after the office determined that, if states could claim sovereign
immunity, the only remedy available to a copyright owner would be
injunctive relief.50 During the legislative hearings, then Register of
Copyrights, Ralph Oman, stated, "'there are approximately $1.1 bil-
lion of book sales to entities with potential Eleventh Amendment im-
munity who can copy and seriously erode the market. '"' 51 Eamon
Fennessy, President of the Copyright Clearance Center 52 ("CCC"),
43. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
44. See id.
45. Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302-303, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 302-303 (1994)).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 101-282, at 1-2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949,
3949-50.
47. 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit stated:
[W]e find an abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity only when Congress
has included in the statute unequivocal and specific language indicating an intent
to subject states to suit in federal court. Such language is absent from the Copy-
right Act of 1976. We recognize that our holding will allow states to violate the federal
copyright laws with virtual impunity. It is for Congress, however, to remedy this
problem.
Id. at 1400 (emphasis added).
48. 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (explaining that in order for Congress to implement
legislation that abrogates state sovereign immunity, Congress must set forth its intention to
abrogate state sovereign immunity and that intention must be clearly and unequivocally set
forth in the statute itself).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 101-282, at 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3951.
50. See H.R. REp. No. 101-282, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3956 (citing Re-
port of the Register of Copyrights, Copyright Liability of States iv, at 103 (June 1988)).
51. H.R. REP. No. 101-282, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3956 (quoting Hear-
ings on H.R. 1131, the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellec-
tual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1989) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights)).
52. Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC") is an agency which is a licensor of photo-
copy reproduction rights. See Copyright Clearance Center, Creating Copyright Solutions, at
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also presented testimony that "two public universities [had with-
drawn] . . .from discussions about photocopy licenses as a result of
judicial decisions upholding assertions of sovereign immunity."53
The Register of Copyrights also submitted a report stating: "'The
Copyright Office is convinced that Congress intended to hold states
responsible under the federal copyright law and that copyright propri-
etors have demonstrated that they will suffer immediate harm if they
are unable to sue infringing states in federal court." 54 The Commit-
tee on the Judiciary agreed. 55
D. The Net Effect of the Clarification Acts
Congress clearly evinced its intent to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in suits brought under federal trademark, patent, and copy-
right law when it enacted the TRCA, PRCA, and CRCA, respectively.
The constitutional history of the Patent Clause seems to indicate that
the Framers took for granted that federally created property rights
were within the domain of Congress.5 6 It, therefore, scarcely seems
plausible that Congress did not have the authority to enact the legisla-
tion. After all, Congress clearly had the exclusive authority to create
the property rights. 57 Following that same logic, Congress should then
also have the authority to indicate who is eligible to be granted the
rights and who is legally liable for infringing on those rights.
H. The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade58 ("GATT") re-
sulted from unsuccessful attempts to establish an International Trade
Organization after the Second World War.59 The agreement provides
a treaty mechanism for establishing a code of conduct for interna-
tional trade among World Trade Organization ("WTO") member
http://www.copyright.com/About/default.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2000). For an annual
fee, CCC provides its members with a centralized photocopy license to more than 1.75
million works in compliance with United States copyright law. See id.
53. H.R. REP. No. 101-282, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3956.
54. Id. (quoting Report of the Register of Copyrights, Copyright Liability of States iv, at
309 (June 1988)).
55. See id.
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
57. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3.
58. GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
59. See 1 LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 15, at 1-2.
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countries. 60 GATT included an agreement directed to Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPs" or "TRIPs Agreement") that
established a comprehensive standard for protection of intellectual
property rights and the enforcement of intellectual property rights in
all WTO member countries. 61 In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act 6 2 to implement the GATT/TRIPs Agreement.
A. Trademark Provisions
With respect to trademarks, TRIPs provides:
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right
to prevent all third parties not having the owner's consent from us-
ing in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or
services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which
the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likeli-
hood of confusion. 63
Article 17 of TRIPs creates limited exceptions to this rule by al-
lowing "[m]embers [to] provide limited exceptions to the rights con-
ferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided
that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the
owner of the trademark and of third parties."64 At the time Congress
agreed to TRIPs, United States trademark law already provided that
any person who used a trademark in commerce, reproduced a trade-
mark, or colorably imitated a trademark would be liable to the trade-
mark owner.65 Thus, United States trademark law only required minor
60. See id. As of November 30, 2000, there are 140 member countries in the WTO. See
WTO, Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif-e/
org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2001).
61. See 1 LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 15, at 1-2.
62. Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
63. TRIPs Agreement art. 16 (emphasis added).
64. TRIPs Agreement art. 17.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Section 1114 provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imita-
tion of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to la-
bels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements in-
tended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive,
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changes in order to comply with TRIPs. 66
TRIPs does not recognize governmental taking as a valid excep-
tion to the trademark owner's exclusive rights. Because there is no
provision in TRIPs allowing for governmental takings, Florida Prepaid
!l-which allows state governmental agencies to violate a trademark
owner's "exclusive right" without providing a remedy6 7-has placed
the United States in direct violation of TRIPs.
B. Patent Provisions
Article 28 of TRIPs specifies that "a patent must include the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or im-
porting the product. ' 68 The Agreement permits limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent under Article 31, if certain
conditions are met.
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
including use by the government... the following provisions shall be
respected: (a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its
individual merits; (b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to
such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authoriza-
tion from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a rea-
sonable period of time ... (h) the right holder shall be paid ade-
quate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization .... 69
When TRIPs was adopted, United States law already provided that
a person who makes, uses, or offers for sale any patented invention
within the United States or imports into the United States any pat-
ented invention during the term of the patent infringes the patent.7 0
And, following enactment of the PRCA, "anyone" included states. 7 1
Because of the apparent similarity between TRIPs and existing United
States law, it is not surprising that the legislative history of the PRCA
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
Id.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 991 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 4287
(explaining that the only changes required for United States trademark law to comply with
TRIPs were to "the definition of 'abandonment' under the trademark law; [and] registra-
bility under the trademark law of a misleading geographic indication identifying wines or
spirits").
67. See Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
68. TRIPs Agreement art. 28.
69. TRIPs Agreement art. 31 (emphasis added).
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
71. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 11 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3097.
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notes that "[m] uch of what was negotiated in the Uruguay Round will
require no change in existing U.S. law or practice for
implementation." 72
Under United States law, exceptions to patent rights were specifi-
cally set out in section 271 (e) of the Patent Act.7 3 The only changes to
federal patent law that Congress contemplated as being necessary as a
result of TRIPs were: changing the term of the patent from seventeen
years from issue date to twenty years from earliest effective filing date;
establishing an internal priority application process to ensure that do-
mestic applicants were accorded the same ultimate term length as for-
eign applicants; and recognizing inventive activities in WTO
countries74 for purposes of establishing inventive rights. 75
TRIPs delineates very limited circumstances in which the law of
Member States may allow for use without authorization.7 6 Governmen-
tal use is one such circumstance. 77 The exception provided for in
TRIPs requires that the government first attempt to obtain authoriza-
72. H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773,
3784.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
74. The United States is the only country in the world that grants patent rights to the
first to invent the idea. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.01, at 10-8 (2000).
All other countries grant patent rights to the first applicant to file the patent application in
the patent office. See id. As a result of this difference, the United States has a procedure
known as an "interference" which is an administrative proceeding within the patent office
to determine which applicant is entitled to be the inventor. See id. § 10.02 [2] [a], at 10-10.
In these proceedings, the inventors provide documentation relating to conception of the
invention and reduction of the invention to practice. See id. § 10.0311], at 10-28. Tradition-
ally, only evidence of inventive activities within the United States was admissible in these
proceedings. See id. § 10.03[3], at 10-49. As a result of the GATT/TRIPs Agreement, how-
ever, the United States was required to change its laws to allow foreign applicants from
WTO member countries to submit evidence in support of an earlier conception based on
activity in their own country. See id. § 10.03[3], at 10-50.
75. SeeH.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 991 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773,
4287. The House Report provided that:
treatment of inventive activity occurring in WTO member countries for purposes
of establishing the date of invention under U.S. law; the definition of infringing
activity under a patent relating to offers for sale and importation of patented
goods; the term of protection of a patent; and establishment of a provisional pat-
ent application system and a right of internal priority for patent applications filed
originally in the United States, as well as enabling a patent applicant to extend
the term of patents that are delayed by interference proceedings, secrecy orders,
and successful appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences or a
federal court.
Id.




tion from the patent holder.78 Only after that attempt is made is the
governmental taking, under limited circumstances, allowable. 79 Be-
cause United States law does not provide for any situation where gov-
ernmental taking is authorized, the TRIPs provision of an attempted
negotiation was not implemented into United States law when it was
amended to comply with GATT. Now, however, as a result of Florida
Prepaid I, states can, in effect, take patent rights without being liable
for infringement or providing an adequate remedy to restore the pat-
ent holder's right to exclude others and receive monetary compensa-
tion.80 Since this taking occurs without the exceptions that would have
made the taking acceptable under GATT, United States law is no
longer in compliance with GATT.
C. Copyright Provisions
The copyright provisions of TRIPs8 ' require that member coun-
tries comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention
(1971).82 The object of the Berne Convention is to provide a mini-
mum level of uniform protection to literary and artistic works.8 3
Under the Berne Convention, authors "have the exclusive right of au-
thorizing the production of these works, in any manner or form. '8 4
TRIPs specifically provides that computer programs are protected as
literary works under the Berne Convention.8 5 Exceptions exist only
where "such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author."8 6 Under United States law, authors have ex-
clusive rights to reproduce their copyrighted works, as well as to pre-
pare derivative works based on their original work.8 7 These rights
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
81. TRIPs Agreement art. 9.
82. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Revision, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Con-
vention]. The Berne Convention provides that "[i]t shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work
and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." Id.
83. See id.
84. Berne Convention art. 2.
85. See TRIPs Agreement art. 10.
86. Berne Convention art. 9(2).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Section 107 provides authors the exclusive right to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
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include the right to distribute copies or to transfer ownership of the
right.88
With the CRCA already in place, TRIPs created only a few
changes in federal law, including:
rental rights in computer programs; protection against unautho-
rized fixation in a sound recording or music video of a live per-
formance or the communication to the public of the sounds of a
live performance; restoration of copyright protection to works al-
ready in existence and not protected by federal copyright in the
United States, but that are subject to neighboring rights or copy-
right protection in the WTO member country that is the source of
the work.8 9
No other changes were required to bring United States copyright law
into compliance with the requirements of TRIPs.
TRIPs does not delineate any exceptions to the copyright owner's
exclusive rights. Because there are no exceptions, a state govern-
ment's use of a copyright without compensating the owner and with-
out providing an adequate remedy under the copyright statutes places
United States law in direct violation of TRIPs.
III. The Florida Prepaid Cases
By the time the Florida Prepaid cases were appealed to the Su-
preme Court, the United States had been a member of the GATT/
TRIPs Agreement for several years. As discussed above, when the
GATT/TRIPs implementing legislation was presented, it was widely
believed that patent, trademark, and copyright infringement actions
could be brought against any infringer, including a state government
infringer, because the PRCA, TRCA, and CRCA had clearly indicated
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audio visual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-




89. H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, at 990 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773,
4287.
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an intent to remove state governmental immunity in the limited con-
text of infringement actions.90
A. Florida Prepaid I
1. Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, College Savings Bank ("College Savings"), a New
Jersey chartered savings bank, marketed and sold certificates of de-
posit ("CDs"). 9 1 The CDs enabled the holder to finance his or her
child's college education. 92 College Savings obtained a patent for the
financing methodology used to ensure that investors had sufficient
funds to pay for college. 93
The Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
("Florida Prepaid"), a Florida state entity, administered a similar tui-
tion prepayment contract, in direct competition with College Savings,
for its residents and their children, which became the basis of a patent
infringement suit brought by College Savings.9 4 It is unclear from the
published facts whether Florida Prepaid was acting as a market partici-
pant in administering the tuition prepayment program or whether it
was merely providing a governmental benefit to its residents. If Flor-
ida Prepaid was acting as a market participant, the usurpation of pri-
vate patent rights for its financial benefit, while claiming immunity
from prosecution, would be substantially more egregious than if the
state was merely providing a benefit to its citizens.9 5
After the PRCA was enacted, College Savings brought an infringe-
ment suit against Florida Prepaid in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey in November, 1994.96 In 1996, after the
United States Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida,97 Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the
PRCA "was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to use its Article I
powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity."98 College Savings
90. See discussion supra Part I.
91. See Florida Prepaid 1, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
92. See id. at 631.
93. See College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ., 148 F.3d 1343,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
94. See Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 631.
95. See discussion infra Part V.A.
96. See Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 631.
97. 517 U.S. 44, 74-76 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Con-
gress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against states to enforce legislation enacted
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause).
98. Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 627.
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"countered that Congress had properly exercised its power pursuant
to [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to enforce the
due process guarantees in [section] 1 of the Amendment."99 The dis-
trict court agreed with College Savings, denied Florida Prepaid's mo-
tion to dismiss, and the Third Circuit affirmed. 100 In an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Cir-
cuit and overruled the district court's opinion, finding that Congress
unconstitutionally abrogated state sovereign immunity when it en-
acted the PRCA.101
2. The Court's Rationale
a. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and the Seminole Tribe Test
In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court relied on its hold-
ing in Seminole Tribe, which confirmed the presupposition that each
state is a sovereign entity in the federal system, and it is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be subject to a suit brought by an
individual without consent. 10 2 Seminole Tribe involved a challenge to
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("Act") passed by Congress under
the Indian Commerce Clause, found in Article I, section 8 of the Con-
stitution. 10 3 The Act purported to allow gaming activities by the Indi-
ans in conformance with a valid compact with the state. 10 4 The Act
further required states to negotiate with the Indians in good faith.' 0 5
The Seminole Tribe Court held that the Eleventh Amendment pre-
vented Congress from making the State of Florida subject to suits
brought by Indian tribes seeking to enforce the legislation in federal
court. 106
The Florida Prepaid I Court used the two-part test established in
Seminole Tribe to determine whether Congress' enactment of the PRCA
validly abrogated states' sovereign immunity. First, the Court looked
at "whether Congress has 'unequivocally expresse [d] its intent to ab-
rogate the immunity,' . . . and second, whether Congress has acted
'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.' "107 The Court found that Con-
gress had no authority to abrogate states sovereign immunity when it
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 630.
102. See id. at 634 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)).
103. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 76.
107. Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 635 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55).
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enacted the PRCA since Congress did not have a compelling reason to
do so in accordance with due process.108
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion criticized Congress' attempt to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in the PRCA, but limited its criti-
cism to the manner in which Congress abrogated the immunity.10 9
Specifically, the Court noted that Congress did not present any evi-
dence that states had denied due process to patent holders, thus justi-
fying Congress' action under the Fourteenth Amendment.110 The
Court also noted:
There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, or in
the House or Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute,
that Congress had in mind the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Since Congress was so explicit about invoking
its authority under Article I and its authority to prevent a State
from depriving a person of property without due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment, we think this omission pre-
cludes consideration of the Just Compensation Clause as a basis for
the Patent Remedy Act. 11
The Court's comment left open the possibility that the PRCA could
potentially be enacted under the authority granted Congress in the
Fifth Amendment.1 12
The Supreme Court concluded, "only where the State provides
no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for
its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property with-
out due process result." 13 Since Congress did not fully consider
whether the individual states have remedies available for patent in-
fringement, there was no demonstration of a violation of due process
in this instance." 4 The Court's position was further bolstered by the
fact that Congress only cited cases where the action on the part of a
state was negligent, and the lack of a remedy for negligent conduct
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 115
108. See id. at 640-41 (noting that "[i]n enacting the Patent Remedy Act... Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitu-
tional violations").
109. See id. at 646.
110. See id. at 643.
111. Id. at 642 n.7.
112. See id. at 642 (explaining that, "if the Due Process Clause protects patents, we
know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against their deprivation without due
process under [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
113. Id. at 643.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 645-46 (explaining that "a state actor's negligent act that causes unin-
tended injury to a person's property does not 'deprive' that person of property within the
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b. History of the Constitution's Patent Clause
The Supreme Court acknowledged the need for uniformity in
construction of patent laws. 1 6 The Court indicated that had Congress
limited the coverage of the PRCA to cases where the state refused to
offer a state court remedy, or limited the type of infringement to non-
negligent infringement, the PRCA might have withstood constitu-
tional analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 1 7
Nowhere in the decision did the Court discuss the history of the
Patent Clause or the intent of the Framers with respect to the Patent
Clause. Such a discussion-at least acknowledging the constitutional
concerns underpinning congressional action in enacting the PRCA-
is necessary if the Court is to provide legitimacy to what otherwise has
been labeled a bad decision.1 18
Admittedly, there is a dearth of information and only a few com-
ments to be found relating to the patent and copyright clause of the
Constitution. The comments, however, reveal the expectations of the
Framers that authority over these rights would be exercised only by
the federal government. For example, one commentator at the time
noted:
The powers vested in the federal government are particularly de-
fined, so that each state still retains its sovereignty in what concerns
its own internal government and a right to exercise every power of
a sovereign state not particularly delegated to the government of
the United States. The new powers vested in the United States [in
the patent and trademark clause] are .. .for promoting the pro-
gress of science in the mode therein pointed out.' 19
During the Pennsylvania Convention, Thomas McKean echoed
the assertion that state laws are limited to the boundaries of the state,
but further elaborated that patents and copyrights were therefore nec-
essarily federally granted property rights:
[T]he power of securing to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their writings and discoveries could only with effect be ex-
ercised by Congress. For ... the laws of the respective states could
only operate within their respective boundaries, and therefore, a
meaning of the Due Process Clause" (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986))).
116. See id. at 645.
117. See id. at 646-47.
118. See Florida Prepaid v. College Savings, COPYRIGHT L.J. July-Aug. 1999, at 50, 52.
119. 3 ROGER SHERMAN, A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN CONNECTICUT COURANT (1788), in
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 525 (Merrill Jen-
sen ed., 1978) (hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
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work which had cost the author his whole life to complete, when
published in one state, however it might there be secured, could
easily be carried into another state in which a republication would
be accompanied with neither penalty nor punishment-a circum-
stance manifestly injurious to the author in particular, and to the
cause of science in general.12 0
Robert Whitehall was the only person who expressed concern
that the power to grant a property right in copyright could, in effect,
also result in a suppression of freedom of the press. He recognized
that:
[t]ho it is not declared that Congress have a power to destroy the
liberty of the press; yet, in effect, they will have it. For they will have
the powers of self-preservation. They have a power to secure to au-
thors the right of their writings. Under this, they may license the
press, no doubt, and under licensing the press, they may suppressit. 12
It seems clear from this history that the Framers had very little
reservation about placing the authority for federally created property
rights within the control of Congress. Congress relied on that history
in enacting the three Clarification Acts: the TRCA, PRCA, and CRCA.
Without even a pause to acknowledge the historical basis for Con-
gress' authority over patents, the Supreme Court overruled that au-
thority in Florida Prepaid I, never considering the context in which
Congress was given that power in the Constitution.
B. Florida Prepaid H
College Savings brought a companion lawsuit against Florida Pre-
paid under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act122 for making misstate-
ments about its tuition savings plan.' 23 Again, Florida Prepaid moved
to dismiss the action on the grounds that Florida had sovereign immu-
nity from the lawsuit and that the TRCA was unconstitutional. 124 As in
Florida Prepaid I, the Supreme Court looked to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to decide the issue. 125 The Court concluded that the two species
of property rights at issue, protected by the Lanham Act-" (1) a right
to be free from a business competitor's false advertising about its own
product, and (2) a more generalized right to be secure in one's busi-
120. 2 THOMAS McKEAN, THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONVEN-
TION (1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 119, at 415.
121. 2 ROBERT WHITEHALL, THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CON-
VENTION (1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 119, at 454.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
123. See Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. 666, 671 (1999).
124. See id.
125. See id.
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ness interests"I 26-were not property rights protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 127 In support of this position, the Court noted that there
was "no decision of this Court (or of any other court, for that matter)
recognizing a property right in freedom from a competitor's false ad-
vertising about its own products." 2 8 In fact, the Court stated, "[t]o
sweep within the Fourteenth Amendment the elusive property inter-
ests that are 'by definition' protected by unfair-competition law would
violate our frequent admonition that the Due Process Clause is not
merely a 'front of tort law."'" 29 Thus, because protection against false
advertising and unfair competition were found not to be valid prop-
erty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded
that there was no deprivation of property at issue. 130
The remainder of the decision concerned whether Florida had
waived its sovereign immunity.'31 College Savings relied on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala-
bama State Docks Department,132 arguing that Florida had impliedly
waived its sovereign immunity by participating in the market. 133 How-
ever, the Court dismissed College Savings' reliance on Parden, describ-
ing Parden as "an elliptical opinion that stands at the nadir of our
waiver (and, for that matter, sovereign immunity) jurisprudence. '" 13 4
The Court continued: "We think that the constructive-waiver experi-
ment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to
salvage any remnant of it . . . . Today, we drop the other shoe:
Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly
overruled."135
In support of this position, the Court noted that, in Employees of
Department of Health & Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Public Health
126. Id. at 672.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 673.
129. Id. at 674 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
130. See id. at 675. Justice Scalia stated that trademarks "are the 'property' of the owner
because he can exclude others from using them." Id. at 673. See also 1 J. THOMAS McCAR-
THY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.14, at 2-29 (2000) (stating
that trademark rights can be characterized as a form of property).
131. See alorida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. at 675.
132. 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stating that although there was no provision in the
Federal Employer's Liability Act providing for suit against the states, common carriers en-
gage in commerce between the states, and, therefore, a state-owned common carrier that
engages in interstate commerce impliedly waives its immunity and consents to suit).
133. See Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. at 676 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State
Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 680.
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& Welfare of Missouri,13 6 it had already retreated from Parden because
the statute at issue, the Fair Labor Standards Act, t 37 did not clearly
express Congress' intention to supersede the states' immunity. 13 8 The
Florida Prepaid II Court acknowledged that Parden was distinguishable
from Missouri Health & Welfare partially on the basis that the state in
Parden was operating for profit "'in [an] area where private persons
and corporations normally ran the enterprise."' 139 Nevertheless, the
Court maintained that "there is little reason to assume actual consent
based upon the state's mere presence in a field subject to congres-
sional regulation.' 140 Thus, the Court impliedly held that a state's
market participation is not behavior indicating a waiver of sovereign
immunity.14 1
IV. What Happens Now If a State Infringes upon a United
States Patent, Trademark, or Copyright Owned by a
Foreign National?
As it now stands, UCLA (a public university) could sue USC (a
private university) for infringement of its intellectual property rights
in federal court under the appropriate federal statute, but USC could
not sue UCLA for the same infringement in federal court. 142 On its
face, this result seems unfair; particularly since a state can utilize the
patent, trademark, and copyright systems for its own financial bene-
fit. 143 The question that arises, however, is what happens when a state-
run university, such as UCLA, infringes upon foreign-owned intellec-
tual property rights? The answer to this question is particularly impor-
tant in view of the United States commitments under TRIPs.
136. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
138. See Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. at 677.
139. Id. at 678 (quoting Employees of Dep't of Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of
Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973)).
140. Id. at 680.
141. See id.
142. SeeFlorida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627, 663 n.14 (1999) (citing S. REP. No. 102-280, at 9
(1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093).
143. Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM") estimates that at least
2000 products presently available to the public would not be available if it were not for
public and private university licensing activities. See http://www.autm.net/ (last visited Jan.
28, 2001). The University of California (a public university) has long been a leader in
patent and licensing activities. See IP, Constitutional Scholars Explore Sovereign Immunity Issues,
59 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 743, 744 (Apr. 7, 2000) (stating that "[t]he PTO's
Justin Hughes furnished statistics indicating that several states have amassed large portfo-
lios of intellectual property, with the University of California 'taking the most cash home'
in patent royalties").
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A. Unix Systems Laboratories v. Berkeley Software Designs, Inc.
Unix Systems Laboratories v. Berkeley Software Designs, Inc.144 was de-
cided prior to the enactment of the Clarification Acts and prior to the
United States entry into GATT. The plaintiff, Unix System Laborato-
ries ("USL"), a Delaware corporation, developed, manufactured, li-
censed, and sold computer operating systems and related products
and services. 145 USL was also an assignee of AT&T's rights to UNIX-
the computer software at issue-at the time of the action.146 The de-
fendant, Berkeley Software Designs, Inc. ("BSDI") was also a recently
formed Delaware corporation, whose officials were members of the
Board of Regents ("Regents") of the University of California. 147 BSDI
developed software for commercial sale and distribution that USL
claimed contained portions of its copyrighted code. 148 The University
had been a licensee of AT&T for 32V UNIX software at a cost of
$200,000 per year. 149 Under the license, BSDI "exercised its contrac-
tual right to derivatize 32V to the hilt" and releases were distributed to
other AT&T licensees through the Regents' Computer Sciences Re-
search Group.1 50 The University sought to improve its income stream
by selling software it developed to non-AT&T licensees.1 5 1
USL brought an action for breach of contract, copyright infringe-
ment, misappropriation of trade secret, and trademark misuse.' 52 The
district court noted that the Eleventh Amendment "bars suit .. .
against the state [and also against] ... a subdivision of the state if the
state remains 'the real party in interest.' '1 53 The court concluded,
however, that the state had partially abrogated its Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity with respect to at least one of the copyright counts
and two of the trademark counts.154
Factually, the case is of interest because it involves a subdivision
of a state engaged in commercial activity that potentially spans, all
three types of federally granted intellectual property rights available
today. The district court in Unix Systems ultimately concluded that un-
144. 832 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.J. 1993).




149. See id. at 794.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 796-97.
153. Id. at 798 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
154. See id. at 799.
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less the plaintiff could demonstrate that there had been a waiver of
sovereign immunity, the University was entitled to Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity.155 As a result of the Florida Prepaid decisions, states
are again entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and a court to-
day faced with an identical fact pattern would likely reach the same
conclusion.
B. Can a Foreign Intellectual Property Owner Bring an Intellectual
Property Infringement Action in Federal Court Against a
State Entity?
1. Hypothetical Based on a Modified Version of Unix Systems
Assume that a foreign intellectual property owner ("FIPO") is in
the business of developing and selling operating systems and interac-
tive computer software programs. FIPO operates in a WTO country.
FIPO has obtained appropriate patent, trademark, and copyright pro-
tection for an operating system ("FO/S") in -the United States. FO/S
contains notices that the software is protected under applicable
United States patent and copyright law and is sold under a federally
registered trademark owned by FIPO.
FIPO subsequently enters into a license agreement with a public
university ("University") in the United States. Under the license, Uni-
versity is entitled to create derivative software from FIPO's FO/S. The
license costs $200,000 per year for each licensee. Because of the li-
cense agreement, the derivative works created by University are sold
only to parties having a license from FIPO for the underlying FO/S.
Sales of the derivative works net University $100,000 per month. Uni-
versity determines that if it sells derivative works to non-FIPO licen-
sees, net sales would increase to $1 million per month. In order to
accomplish this, University develops what it claims is a non-derivatized
software that is fully compatible with FO/S. The software is developed
and prepared for sale. Advertising indicates that the software is fully
compatible with FIPO's software.
FIPO analyzes University's new software and determines that the
software still contains significant portions of FIPO's code in violation
of FIPO's patent and copyright interests in the code. Further, Univer-
sity uses FIPO's registered trademark in its advertising without FIPO's
permission. FIPO now wishes to proceed against University for willful
infringement of its patent, trademark, and copyright.
155. See id. at 800.
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2. Jurisdiction Based on Diversity of Citizenship
Prior to the Florida Prepaid decisions, there were two ways for
FIPO to get into federal court. The first method of obtaining federal
court jurisdiction is by virtue of diversity of citizenship. 156 Diversity of
citizenship enables actions to be brought in federal court under cer-
tain circumstances to avoid prejudice to one of the parties resulting
from being required to sue in the adverse party's local court. 157 How-
ever, diversity jurisdiction is specifically limited by the provisions of
the Eleventh Amendment that provide: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 1 58 Therefore, FIPO, a citizen of a foreign state, would be
barred from bringing an action against University in federal court
based on diversity by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.
3. Federal Question Jurisdiction
However, federal courts do have jurisdiction, either concurrent
or exclusive, over issues arising under federal law.' 59 Issues relating to
patent, trademark, and copyright are classic examples of causes of ac-
tion that fall within exclusive federal question jurisdiction. 160 Neither
the patent statute nor the copyright statute itself expressly provides
that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of infringement
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
157. See id. Section 1332 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceed the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of inter-
est and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
For purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to
the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State
in which such alien is domiciled.
Id.
158. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States").
160. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 281 (Supp. IV 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994 & Supp. IV
1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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matters. For example, 35 U.S.C. section 281161 provides only that "[a]
patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his pat-
ent."1 62 However, exclusive jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1338(a) 163 which states: "The district court shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relat-
ing to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks.
Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in pat-
ent, plant variety protection and copyright cases."' 64 Moreover, the
Lanham Act specifically provides that "[t]he district and territorial
courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction . . . of all
actions arising under this Act." t 65 Accordingly, patent, trademark, and
copyright matters are brought in federal court on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction.
Thus, even though FIPO would not have standing to bring an
action against University based on diversity against a state infringer in
federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, traditionally
FIPO would have standing to bring an action against a state infringer
in federal court because the subject matter relates to a federal ques-
tion. However, following the Florida Prepaid decisions, FIPO would be
barred from bringing an infringement cause of action against Univer-
sity under 28 U.S.C. section 1338 in federal court since the Clarifica-
tion Acts have been invalidated by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional abrogations of state sovereign immunity. FIPO will,
therefore, have to depend on other avenues for redress.
V. Possible Solutions
After the Florida Prepaid cases, FIPO cannot bring an action for
infringement against the University in federal court. The question be-
comes: Are there any remedies available to FIPO that will restore its
right to exclude others and be compensated for its intellectual
property?
A. Eminent Domain Laws
In theory, FIPO may rely on the eminent domain laws of the indi-
vidual states in order to obtain redress for misappropriated property.
The sovereign states may take property for public use without the
161. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (Supp. IV 1999).
162. Id.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
164. Id.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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owner's consent upon giving just compensation. 166 One problem, of
course, is that there is no uniform process for compensation. 67 The
condemnation clause found in most state constitutions provides for
payment of 'Just compensation" upon the taking of private property
for public use. 168 "In the absence of a statute allowing compensation,
it has been held that a state is not liable for costs where it is the con-
demnor.' 69 This "public use" exception is contrary to the provisions
of the patent, trademark, and copyright laws which specifically allow
for costs and treble damages where the infringing use has been
willful.
1 70
Another problem is that eminent domain laws are meant to com-
pensate for taking property for public use after the taking has oc-
curred. Examples of traditional eminent domain issues arise when the
state condemns land in order to install a public highway. 171 However,
taking intellectual property for governmental commercial exploita-
tion may not be a "public use" that eminent domain laws contem-
plate. 172 The logic of applying the law of eminent domain to
compensate for willful governmental taking of intellectual property is
unsound, particularly where that governmental taking commercially
benefits the state. It is one thing to have the right to condemn real
property located within a state for the benefit of all the citizens of a
state, and quite another to take intellectual property of a non-citizen
166. See 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 1-10 (3d ed. 2000).
167. There are several models of compensation that, in the eminent domain context,
fall within the notion of 'just compensation." These models are: (1) utilitarian models; (2)
justice and fairness models; (3) natural law models; and (4) property rights or consent
models. See IA NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1A.02, at 1A-3 (3d ed. 2000). There also are
at least three different measures of "compensation": market value of the property, value to
the owner of the property, and value to the person taking the property. Id. § IA.0412] [d],
at IA-217. Nichols concludes, however, that "none of the three measures is optimal in all
situations." Id. § IA.04[2] [d.6], at 1A-219.
168. See 6A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 30.01[2],at 30-10 (3d ed. 2000).
169. Id. § 30.02, at 30-22.
170. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) provides that "the Court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed." Id. 17 U.S.C. § 504(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)
provides that where the "infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion
may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000." Id. 15
U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) provides that "the court shall.., enter judgment
for three times such profits or damages, whichever is greater... in the case of any violation
of section 1114(1)(a)." Id.
171. See 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.22[1], at 1-78 (3d ed. 2000) (describing
roads as the primary object for the exercise of eminent domain).
172. "Eminent Domain, as it now exists, seems to have grown out of the ancient pro-
ceeding known as inquest of office. This was an inquiry by jurors concerning any matter
that entitled the king to possession of lands, tenements, good and chattels . Id.
§ 1.21[1], at 1-72.
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for commercial exploitation even if that exploitation ultimately bene-
fits the citizens of the state. In both cases the citizens of the state are
ultimately benefited by the governmental taking. In the case of the
non-citizen's intellectual property, however, there is a taking from an
owner who has no connection to the state, except possibly a commer-
cial tie, and who will not receive the tangential benefit that the state
citizens receive from that taking.
More importantly, while any successful eminent domain proceed-
ing brought against the state infringer would provide some monetary
relief to FIPO, it would not restore FIPO's right to exclude others
from using its intellectual property.
B. The Ex Parte Young Procedure
Another possible avenue for recourse available to FIPO would be
to take advantage of the Ex Parte Young173 procedure that enables a
party to bring a suit for equitable relief against a state official. 174 Ex
Parte Young involved a suit by a stockholder of a corporation attempt-
ing to enjoin the directors and officers of the corporation from com-
plying with a state statute that the stockholders claimed was
unconstitutional. 175 The Supreme Court held that a federal court
could enjoin an individual or state officer from enforcing a state stat-
ute on account of its unconstitutionality.' 76
In this scenario, FIPO could bring an action to obtain an injunc-
tion against University.1 77 This injunction would restore FIPO's basic
right to exclude others from using its intellectual property.1 78 How-
ever, even though FIPO may at least be able to obtain an injunction
under this procedure, it is unlikely that FIPO could get damages for
the infringement unless state officials, sued in their individual capaci-
ties, were actually acting in their official capacities. 179 The Ex Parte
Young procedure contemplates enjoining a state official from engag-
173. 209 U.S. 123 (1907).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 129-30.
176. See id. at 167-68.
177. See Intellectual Property, Constitutional Scholars Explore Sovereign Immunity Issues, 59
Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 743, 744 (Apr. 7, 2000) ("[T]he 90 year old Ex Parte
Young doctrine permits suits against state officials for injunctive relief... Menell (of Boalt
Hall) responded that the right to sue would depend on whether the official was acting in
his or her official capacity.").
178. See id.
179. See id.
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ing in activity on the basis of equity) °80 It does not, however, provide
for damages.
Thus, any successful Ex Parte Young proceeding that FIPO
brought against University would restore FIPO's right to exclude
others from using FIPO's intellectual property, but would probably
not enable FIPO to be compensated for the taking itself.
C. Qui Tam Actions
Qui tam actions 81 allow private individuals to sue on behalf of the
United States.18 2 The Supreme Court has previously held that qui tam
actions are exempt from any claim of sovereign immunity by the
states.18 3 It has been suggested that if Congress set up a penalty for
state infringement of intellectual property rights, the holder of the
intellectual property right at issue could sue the state on behalf of the
United States and ultimately be compensated if successful. 184
However, qui tam actions are not currently recognized in all con-
texts.18 5 Thus, Congress would need to first authorize suits by the
United States against state infringers with the consent of the injured
party.186 Even if qui tam actions were recognized, it would be an ex-
tremely complex proceeding that ultimately may not withstand a con-
stitutional challenge.' 87
180. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 162.
181. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994).
182. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). Section 3730(b)(1) provides:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person
and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name
of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attor-
ney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for
consenting.
Id.
183. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892); accord West Virginia v. United
States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987).
184. SeeJonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress'Power to Abrogate State Sovereign
Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REv. 539, 552 (1995) (stating that first Congress would need to au-
thorize the suit by the United States and then proceeds would be paid to the United States
Treasury before being redirected to the claimant).
185. See id. at 556.
186. See id.
187. See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 1042; see also Scott P. Glaubman, Citizen Suits
Against States: The ExclusiveJurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc' U.S.A. 63, 102 (1997)
(noting that "[t]he Court has never squarely resolved the permissibility of... [the qui tam]
maneuver).
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D. Problems with the Possible Solutions
FIPO's recourse, at this point, is to use one of the proceedings
described above or to find another basis for suit (such as breach of
contract). 188 In either event, FIPO is put in the untenable position of
negotiating with a party that it knows can circumvent the law if it does
not like the offered terms.
One glaring problem with using the eminent domain provisions
of the individual state laws, the Ex Parte Young procedures, or the qui
tam procedure is that these procedures provide limited remedies to
the intellectual property holder. The intellectual property holder is
not able to fully restore the right to exclude others and does not re-
ceive monetary damages for the infringing use. Moreover, despite the
minimal effectiveness of these procedures, they still would not resolve
compliance issues under the GATT.
For example, TRIPs acknowledges that governmental taking of
patent rights may be appropriate in some circumstances, but requires
that "the proposed user ma[k]e efforts to obtain authorization from
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions."1'8 9
United States law has never provided for a mechanism to allow a state
to take patent rights. Therefore, unless legislation were presented that
required the state to "obtain authorization," as provided for in TRIPs,
any taking of patent rights by a state, regardless of the type of post
facto remedy available, violates TRIPs. If, however, United States law
was restored to the pre-Forida Prepaid condition, where states are lia-
ble for infringement, then the United States would again be in com-
pliance with TRIPs.
To the extent that eminent domain laws are available as a means
for pursuing a state infringer, the remedies available do not com-
pletely comply with the provisions of GATT/TRIPs. First, FIPO's right
to exclude others is violated because eminent domain laws arise when
the taking has already occurred and only provide a post facto mecha-
nism to compensate for the taking. Under the patent, trademark, and
copyright laws (as they were interpreted prior to the Florida Prepaid
cases), FIPO's right to exclude others is not lost in the event of an
infringement because FIPO could obtain an injunction from further
infringement. Second, as noted above, the measure of compensation
provided for in an eminent domain action is not consistent with
188. See Intellectual Property, Constitutional Scholars Explore Sovereign Immunity Issues, supra
note 177, at 744.
189. TRIPs Agreement art. 31.
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TRIPs. The measure of compensation could be based on the market
value of the property, the value of the property to FIPO, or the value
of the property to the state infringer.1 90 However, these measure-
ments of compensation do not account for economic value, which is
exactly the type of compensation provided for under TRIPs when the
government takes patent rights.19' Lastly, even if the compensation
provided for under eminent domain laws is sufficient in the context of
taking patent rights, it does not overcome the fact that TRIPs does not
provide an exception for governmental taking of trademark or copy-
right interests.
The unavailability of monetary damages renders the Ex Parte
Young procedure inadequate to fulfill the GATT/TRIPs requirement
that the "right holder be paid adequate remuneration."' 92 The Ex
Parte Young procedure only restores half of FIPO's property rights;
that is, the right to exclude others. Thus, although Ex Parte Young
would allow FIPO to obtain an injunction, it fails to provide the right
holder compensation and so does not make the aggrieved party
"whole" again.
A qui tam action would require legislation enabling FIPO to bring
suit on behalf of the United States. If such actions could pass constitu-
tional muster, it would be the most effective remedy available to bring
the United States back into compliance with GATT/TRIPs since FIPO
could receive an injunction and monetary damages from University.
Conclusion
The United States is currently out of compliance with GATT.
Remedies available to the intellectual property owner do not ade-
quately restore its rights to exclude others from using the property
right and provide for compensation. Legislation presented to the Sen-
ate during the last term 193 is a step in the right direction for cor-
recting the problem, but it does not address the issue of compliance
with TRIPs. Any new legislation that is presented should be carefully
drafted to bring state infringers in line with the requirements of
TRIPs, regardless of the fact that such legislation may leave states
stripped of sovereign immunity in this limited context. Section 102 of
190. See IA NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § IA.04[2] [d], at IA-217 (3d ed. 2000).
191. See TRIPs Agreement art. 31.
192. Id.
193. See Intellectual Property Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong. § 111
(1999) (proposing to condition a State's participation in the federal intellectual property
system on an unambiguous waiver of immunity).
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the Uruguay Round Agreements Act describes the relationship be-
tween the agreements and United States law and state law.
1 94
Under this section, no state law may be declared invalid on the
ground that it is inconsistent with the Uruguay Round agreements,
except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of
declaring such law invalid. The Statement of Administrative Action
states:
The Uruguay Round Agreements do no automatically "pre-
empt" or invalidate state laws that do not conform to the rules
set out in those agreements-even if a dispute settlement
panel were to find a state measure inconsistent with such an
agreement.... Each WTO member will be free to determine
how it will conform with those agreements at the national and
sub-national level. The Administration is committed to carry-
ing out U.S. obligations under the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, as they apply to the states, through the greatest
possible degree of state-federal consultation and cooperation,
in conformity with the consultative framework established
under section 102 .... 195
Thus, it is possible, using the mechanism provided in the Act, to
facilitate an agreement among the states for changes to United States
law that would be acceptable to bring the United States back into full
compliance with GATT.
194. See GATIT section 102.
195. H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt.2, at 16 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013,
4028.
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